
CVE-2026-123890: what vSphere 7 end of support means in practice
CVE-2026-123890 is exploited and vCenter 7 has no public patch. Patch vCenter 8 and 9, isolate vCenter, check for compromise and plan for 11 October 2027.
In short
- CVE-2026-123890, an authentication bypass in the vCenter directory service rated 9.8, was fixed by Broadcom on 19 November 2026 in vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m, with no workaround.
- For vCenter 7.0, out of general support since 2 October 2025, the advisory of 19 November 2026 lists no public fix: customers with an extended support contract are told to request patches through it.
- Google Threat Intelligence Group says a suspected PRC-nexus actor exploited CVE-2026-123890 in early September 2026 against an internal vCenter; CISA added it to its exploited catalogue on 20 November 2026.
- In Switzerland, vSphere 8 leaves general support on 11 October 2027, after which Broadcom says there will be no new patches: 325 days after 20 November 2026.
On this page (8)
On 19 November 2026, Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009 for CVE-2026-123890, an authentication bypass in vCenter rated 9.8 with no workaround, and fixed it in vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m. For vCenter 7.0, out of general support since 2 October 2025 like the rest of vSphere 7, the fixed-version cell reads “Contact Broadcom Support if you have extended support contract.” Google’s threat intelligence group says the flaw was exploited in early September 2026, and CISA added it to its catalogue of exploited vulnerabilities on 20 November 2026, so a vCenter 7 without that contract has an exploited flaw and no public patch.
This post covers the flaw and the fixed versions, the position of vCenter 7, how the attack ran, what end of support means in practice, and a dated plan.
What is CVE-2026-123890, and which vCenter versions are fixed?
Broadcom describes CVE-2026-123890 as “an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VMware Directory Service”: “A malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system.” Its CVSS 3.1 vector needs no privileges and no user interaction. The workaround column reads “None”. Broadcom thanks Mandiant for the report. The advisory was revised on 20 November 2026 (VMSA-2026-0009.1), only “to clarify the impacted VMware Tools versions”; the change log names nothing else.
| vCenter line | Fixed version |
|---|---|
| 9.1.x | 9.1.1.0200 |
| 9.0.x | 9.0.2.0200 |
| 8.0 | 8.0 U3m |
| VCF 5.x | vCenter 8.0 U3m (KB 88287), SDDC Manager 5.2.5 |
| 7.0 | “Contact Broadcom Support if you have extended support contract.” |
Broadcom’s questions and answers on the advisory add four points an operator needs:
- ESX is not affected. The flaw is in vCenter, and only vCenter needs the update. Broadcom says virtual machines keep running while vCenter is updated.
- vSphere 8 needs Update 3. “The vCenter 8.0 fixed version in this advisory is 8.0 U3m.” VMSA-2026-0006 gained an 8.0 U2 express patch on 3 August 2026; this time there is none.
- Mid-upgrade estates must choose. 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 “block upgrades to VCF 9.1.1, and customers should wait, briefly, for VCF 9.1.2”, or upgrade vCenter to 9.1.1 first and patch there.
- It is an emergency change. “The vCenter issue qualifies under ITIL methodologies as an emergency change”.
Is there a vCenter 7 patch for CVE-2026-123890?
Not a public one. Broadcom’s FAQ answers the question directly: “VMware vSphere 7 reached End of General Support on October 2, 2025. If your organization has an active extended support contract, please use those support processes to request patches for these issues.” It adds that Broadcom “strongly encourages customers running downlevel versions to upgrade to VCF 9.1.” KB 415405 gives the same date for vCenter 7.x.
As of 20 November 2026, Broadcom’s public pages name no 7.0 build that carries the fix, and no date for extended support customers. Older lines are told less: for 6.5 and 6.7, the FAQ says “Presume that it does”, because “Broadcom does not evaluate products past their End of General Support dates as part of security advisories”.
This is the second time in four months. VMSA-2026-0006 of 29 July 2026 fixed CVE-2026-59309, another 9.8 authentication bypass in the same directory service, and CVE-2026-59310, a 9.8 flaw in the vCenter syslog server. Its 7.0 row, added in a revision of 19 August 2026, carries the same sentence. CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue added CVE-2026-59310 on 18 August 2026 and marks its use in ransomware campaigns as “Known”.
Is CVE-2026-123890 being exploited?
Yes, according to Google. On 19 November 2026, Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published an account of the “suspected PRC-nexus threat actor ARMORY CASTLE (formerly tracked as UNC5221)”: it “exploited this vulnerability in early September 2026 using BONESAW, according to forensic evidence.” The attribution is GTIG’s. Broadcom’s advisory and FAQ say nothing about exploitation as of 20 November 2026.
CISA added CVE-2026-123890 to its catalogue on 20 November 2026, with a due date of 23 November 2026 and ransomware use marked “Unknown”. The due date binds US federal civilian agencies, not Swiss or EU organisations. The required action also points to CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements”, and tells agencies to “discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable”.
GTIG says the attackers did not start at vCenter:
How the attack reached vCenter, as GTIG describes it
- Edge: A BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day, CVE-2026-102764, gave the first foothold.
- Appliance: The actor scanned for VMware ports and took over an internal Linux appliance without endpoint detection.
- vCenter: BONESAW reached an internal vCenter on port 2012 and created an SSO administrator account.
- Keys: The SAML signing key, the vCenter master key and database credentials were taken.
- Hosts: The actor logged in to ESXi as root and copied data from guest disks.
GTIG writes that BONESAW “achieves full system compromise against vCenter Server 7.x and 8.x appliances”. The flaw discloses a session key over the directory service’s RPC interface and yields “an authenticated session established as administrator@vsphere.local”. With the signing key, a second tool forges SAML tokens that, GTIG says, let the actor “bypass MFA, and impersonate any user”.
An internal vCenter is still a target
The vCenter was not on the internet. BONESAW was used against “an internal vCenter server”, reached from an appliance inside the network. Port 2012, which GTIG describes as “the control interface RPC for vCenter Single Sign-On”, is not a port most teams think of when they review exposure. A management plane is a target after the first compromise, wherever it sits.
The vCenter was patched. BONESAW “was executed in early September 2026 against a vCenter server already patched against CVE-2026-59309”, the July flaw. Mandiant has evidence the actor knew of CVE-2026-123890 before July’s disclosure. Patching the last advisory did not protect it from this one.
GTIG’s conclusion: “relying solely on reactive patching is insufficient”. Its hardening advice is to drop traffic to vCenter’s management ports, port 2012 included, from anything that is not an administration host; to filter outbound traffic from the appliance; and to send its logs to a remote SIEM. It advises “rigorous testing and formal change control” before changing the appliance’s firewall rules.
vSphere 7 end of support: what it means in practice
End of support was announced as a date. In 2026 it looks like this: two critical vCenter advisories in four months, each with a flaw on CISA’s exploited list, and both with a 7.0 cell that sends you to a contract.
vCenter 7 after end of general support
- 2 October 2025: vSphere 7, vCenter included, leaves general support.
- 29 July 2026: VMSA-2026-0006 fixes two 9.8 vCenter flaws.
- 18 August 2026: CISA adds CVE-2026-59310 to its catalogue, ransomware use “Known”.
- 19 August 2026: VMSA-2026-0006.2 adds a 7.0 row that sends customers to extended support.
- Early September 2026: GTIG says ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-123890 against an internal vCenter.
- 19 November 2026: VMSA-2026-0009; the 7.0 row reads as in VMSA-2026-0006.
- 20 November 2026: CISA adds CVE-2026-123890 to its catalogue.
- 23 November 2026: CISA due date for US federal agencies.
- 11 October 2027: vSphere 8 leaves general support.
The same applies to vSphere 8 from 11 October 2027. KB 459135 sets that date for vCenter 8.x, and KB 456708 says that after it “there will be no Technical Support and no new patches”. Broadcom’s extension of 4 November 2026 covers customers in the EEA only, so in Switzerland the date holds, as we set out in vSphere 8 end of support in Switzerland. From 20 November 2026 that is 325 days.
After 11 October 2027, what matters at the next advisory is what the fixed-version cell for vSphere 8 says.
What to do, and by when
Dates
The dates are our suggestion, except 23 November 2026 (CISA’s deadline, binding on US federal civilian agencies only) and 11 October 2027 (Broadcom’s end of general support for vSphere 8).
- Today: patch every vCenter 8 and 9. Install 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 or 9.1.1.0200, or for VCF 5.x apply vCenter 8.0 U3m through KB 88287 and SDDC Manager 5.2.5. Move 8.0 U2 to Update 3 first, check the interoperability matrix against your ESX versions, and ask the vendor of any engineered system for its build.
- Today: let only administration hosts reach vCenter. Allow ports 443, 5480, 22 and 2012 only from named administration workstations or a jump host, and on 443 also from the backup server and other named systems that use its API, at a firewall in front of the appliance, and block its outbound traffic except to the services it needs. Send its logs off the appliance.
- By 23 November 2026: settle every vCenter 7. With an extended support contract, request the patch through it today and record the answer. Without one, upgrade vCenter to 8.0 U3m or 9.x where your licence allows; ESX is not affected, so the hosts can stay where they are if the interoperability matrix allows it. Until then, keep it reachable from a jump host only, or shut it down outside administration windows: Broadcom’s FAQ says workloads keep running and key rotation waits while vCenter is offline; backup jobs that go through vCenter wait too.
- By 27 November 2026: look for signs of compromise. GTIG’s actor switched SSH on through the appliance management API and off again. Check vCenter for SSO or local administrator accounts nobody created, SSH switched on through that API, and connections to port 2012 from hosts that are not administration hosts. On internal Linux appliances, look for the files GTIG names (
/tmp/123,/tmp/sss,/tmp/dbr). On ESXi, look for unknown keys in rootauthorized_keys. A patch does not remove an account the attacker created or invalidate a signing key already stolen: if you find anything, call in incident response, replace the vCenter signing certificates and credentials, and rebuild from a tested backup where needed. - By 18 December 2026: list every management plane. vCenter, ESXi, appliance management interfaces, remote-support and remote-access appliances, backup servers: who can reach each one, from where, and whether it reports to your SIEM. GTIG’s actor went through four: a remote-support appliance, an internal Linux appliance, vCenter and ESXi.
- By 29 January 2027: decide per workload. For each group of machines: extended support with a written scope, vSphere Foundation or VCF 9 on Broadcom’s terms, or an exit to Proxmox VE, KVM or containers in waves. Our Swiss timetable sets the waves.
- By 11 October 2027: no vSphere 8 without a patch source. Every host and vCenter is upgraded, covered by a signed extended support contract, or switched off.
An open-source hypervisor reaches end of life too
The same date arrives on open-source platforms. Proxmox VE 8 reached the end of its life in August 2026, a month after Debian 12, its base, according to the Proxmox VE FAQ; the project supports each release “at least as long as the corresponding Debian version” and says “using the latest stable version is always recommended”. A Proxmox VE 8 host that meets an exploited flaw today is also out of support: it has to be upgraded to 9, and that is work.
The difference lies in what the upgrade depends on. Proxmox publishes its upgrade guide from 8 to 9 with a checklist script, pve8to9, and its code is public. Its no-subscription repository needs no key, though Proxmox describes it as for “testing and non-production use” and recommends its subscription enterprise repository for production. KVM is part of the Linux kernel. A contract buys tested packages and support; it does not decide whether you can reach a fixed release.
The management-plane lesson applies too: Proxmox VE’s web interface and API belong on an administration network like vCenter. What keeps an open-source platform safe is the same operating practice: management planes on a private network, only supported major versions, upgrades rehearsed before the end-of-life date, and tested backups. Run that way, an exploited flaw becomes a scheduled fix rather than a contract question, and a cell reading “contact support” no longer decides whether you can patch, which is the point of avoiding lock-in.
How Pilae fits
Pilae moves virtual machines off vSphere to Proxmox VE, plain KVM or containers and runs the result on your premises or on dedicated machines in Pilae Cloud, the same way it operates open-source apps. On premises comes first, usually on the servers you already have; operation on your premises starts on the Business plan, and plans are on the pricing page.
- A target for every machine, at a fixed price. We read your vCenter export and decide with you whether each machine moves as a VM, is rebuilt as a container or is retired. The VMware exit plan sets the order of waves at a fixed price agreed before work starts.
- Waves with the source as the rollback. Each wave is converted, tested by its owner and switched over in an agreed window, and the source machine stays intact on VMware until its owner signs off.
- Pilae access only through the private mesh. Apps answer only on the private mesh, with one hardened gate on port 443 if you want one. Pilae engineers reach your servers only through that mesh, each with a named account, logged in the audit trail; you can limit access to your maintenance windows and approve each session.
- Critical fixes within your plan’s time. Under an on-premises contract, critical fixes are planned and proposed to you within the time your plan specifies.
- Host and guest updates you approve. After the move, the Pilae Agent plans every host and guest update and waits for your approval before it is applied.
If CVE-2026-123890 found a vCenter 7 in your estate, the 325 days to 11 October 2027 are the time to leave on a plan rather than after the next advisory. Talk to an engineer: send us your vCenter inventory, and we name a target for each group of machines and quote the migration at a fixed price.
Cover: photo by Darshan Sarang on Unsplash, redrawn in pixels.


